The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance package is adopted. Trilogue agreement came on 25 June 2025, the Council adopted on 5 March 2026 and Parliament on 26 March, with entry into force and transposition running from publication in the Official Journal. Transposition is still ahead, so this is a file to track rather than close.
What it does is easy to state and easy to underestimate. It leaves the MREL calibration architecture intact and extends resolution's reach downward: more mid-sized banks earmarked for resolution rather than national insolvency, funded by a more usable deposit guarantee scheme bridge. The package also carries MREL adjustments, but the three-part calibration that determines the size of the requirement is untouched.
So the reform is not about how much. It is about who.
Consider what a meaningful MREL target actually requires of a bank that has not carried one.
The calibration is a loss-absorption amount, a recapitalization amount and a market-confidence charge, giving roughly twice the total capital requirement plus buffers, expressed in parallel as a percentage of risk exposure and a percentage of leverage exposure. Both legs bind.
Then comes the harder part. The liabilities have to be subordinated to deposits, derivatives, structured notes and the other excluded liabilities that resolution must keep performing. Subordination can be contractual, structural through a clean holding company, or statutory through creditor-hierarchy legislation, and the statutory route is the one most member states legislated, anchored on senior non-preferred issuance.
A bank moving from national insolvency to a bail-in strategy is therefore not simply being asked to hold more. It is being asked to establish and maintain a subordinated funding program in an instrument class it may have no history in.
The guide's estimate of how long that takes across the affected cohort is the sentence worth internalizing: the build-out runs into the late 2020s.
The interesting thing about CMDI is not the reform in isolation. It is that gone-concern coverage is now the dimension on which the three major frameworks most visibly disagree, while their calibration logic remains broadly shared.
The EU applies MREL to all banks earmarked for resolution, and CMDI extends that reach downward.
The UK moved the other way in 2025. The Bank of England raised its indicative resolution thresholds to £25bn to £40bn of total assets from £15bn to £25bn, reviewed every three years from 2028, alongside an unchanged 40,000 to 80,000 transactional-accounts criterion. Transfer-strategy firms now generally carry MREL equal to their minimum capital requirements with no add-on, and growing banks crossing the thresholds get firm-specific glide paths of six years from transition start, extendable by two. That eased what the UK challenger banks had made their loudest complaint, the MREL cliff.
The US never extended coverage at all. TLAC and the long-term debt requirement apply to eight G-SIBs, and the post-2023 proposal to extend a long-term debt requirement to large regionals has had no final action and is dormant.
Read those three together and the divergence is not about calibration technique. It is about which banks are expected to fail through bail-in rather than through something else.
There is one piece of evidence on the question, and it points at the gap the US left rather than at either European answer.
SVB had no TLAC and no long-term debt requirement. There was nothing between its equity and its uninsured depositors, so resolution had to improvise: the FDIC's systemic-risk exception and an industry-assessed levy did what bail-in was invented to do. The guide's finding is precise about what failed there, and it was coverage: gone-concern requirements stopping at eight banks.
The UK has a counter-example on the same weekend, though a narrower one than it is often made to carry. SVB's UK subsidiary was sold under the resolution regime without public funds, and the Bank of England treats that as standing evidence that the UK's largest banks are resolvable in practice. It is evidence about resolvability, on one transaction, at a subsidiary that had a buyer.
If you are at an EU bank in the mid-sized band, the question to answer is not what your MREL number will be. It is whether your resolution strategy is bail-in or transfer, because that determines whether you need a subordinated funding program at all, and the resolution authority's answer is the one that counts. The SRB's MREL policy is updated annually and is being aligned to CMDI, so the operative detail will arrive through policy rather than through the Directive.
If you already issue, the change is competitive rather than regulatory: a larger cohort of issuers arriving in the same instrument class over the same few years.
And if you run a group across both regimes, note that the calibration logic is shared, inherited from the same TLAC term sheet, while the scope decisions are diverging. Scope is what determines whether the logic applies to you at all, and it is now the part that differs by jurisdiction rather than the arithmetic.
Lost in the acronyms? Our capital regulation glossary decodes 97 of them in one table.
For the complete capital stack, from CET1, buffers and the output floor to Pillar 2 and MREL, and how Basel, the EU, the UK and the US implement them, see Mirai RiskTech's guide capital regulation across Basel, the EU, the UK and the US: a complete reference.